In this lecture, I explore some commonly held perceptions of public company executive compensation and corporate governance in the United States: 1) CEOs are overpaid and their pay keeps increasing; 2) CEOs are not paid for performance; and 3) boards are not doing their jobs. For example, Bebchuk and Fried conclude that, "flawed compensation arrangements have not been limited to a small number of 'bad apples'; they have been widespread, persistent, and systemic." 1 I consider the accuracy of these perceptions today, and discuss the implications and challenges that evidence poses for researchers, boards, and shareholders. How is pay measured?
ExecuComp also follows the CEOs of over 1,000 smaller companies not in the S&P 500. Average estimated pay for these CEOs, like S&P 500 CEOs, increased in the 1990s and declined in the 2000s. Today's average pay roughly equals its 1998 level.
Overall, then, estimated CEO pay -what boards expect to pay their CEOspeaked around 2000, both for S&P 500 and non-S&P 500 CEOs. Since then, average estimated CEO pay has declined, returning roughly to its 1998 level.
While average pay has declined since 2000, it remains very high in absolute terms. In 2010, the average S&P 500 CEO received estimated pay of just over $10 million. This is roughly 200 times the median household income in the United States and undoubtedly also contributes to the perception that CEOs are overpaid.
Turnover
The average lengths of CEO tenures today are shorter than in the past. As a result, comparing CEO pay in the 2000s to CEO pay in the 1990s (and earlier) is not an apples-to-apples comparison. In the 1970s, 1980s, and mid-1990s, roughly 10 percent of large U.S. company CEOs turned over each year, not counting takeovers. 3 Since 1998, annual turnover has increased to an average of 12 percent, implying a decline in CEO tenure from ten to eight years. Including takeovers, tenures have declined from roughly eight years before 1998 to only six years since.
The decline in tenure implies that the CEO's job has become riskier over time.
The shorter expected tenure arguably offsets roughly 20 percent of the increase in CEO pay since the early 1990s 4 . The true increase in CEO pay since then is lower than the compensation figures alone would suggest.
How does CEO pay compare to that of other highly paid people?
Gabaix and Landier 5 argue that market forces can explain the increases in CEO pay. In a simple competitive model, they show that CEO pay will rise as firms become larger because larger average firm size increases the returns to hiring more productive CEOs. They find empirically that the increase in CEO pay since 1980 can be fully attributed to the increase in large company market values. Public company executives, those who should be more subject to managerial power problems, saw their pay increase less than executives of closely-held company businesses which are, by definition, controlled by large shareholders or the executives, and are subject to limited agency problems. This is notable because many of the salaried and closely-held executives likely come from the same executive pool and, presumably, can move between public and private company employment.
What does this mean?
The point of these comparisons is to confirm that while public company CEOs earn a great deal, they are not unique. Other groups with similar backgrounds and talents -private company executives (as well as corporate lawyers, investors and others) -have seen significant pay increases where there is a competitive market for talent and no managerial power problems exist. If one uses evidence of higher CEO pay as evidence of managerial power, one must also explain why these other groups have had a similar or higher growth in pay. Instead, it seems more likely that market forces have drive a meaningful portion of the increase in public company CEO pay.
Josh Rauh and I concluded that some combination of changes in technology, along with an increase in the scale of enterprises and finance, have allowed more talented or fortunate people to increase their productivity relative to others. This seems relevant for the pay increases of lawyers and investors (technology allows them to acquire information and trade large amounts more efficiently) as well as CEOs (technology allows them to manage very large global organizations). Frydman and Saks study the correlation between an executive's wealth and firm performance. They find that CEO wealth has been strongly tied to firm performance since the 1930s, and that relationship "strengthened considerably" after the mid-1980s.
The evidence, then, is consistent with realized CEO pay and CEO wealth being strongly tied to firm performance. The more difficult question is how much pay-forperformance is optimal, and whether current practices can become more efficient.
Some argue that pay-for-performance is too low and should be increased. Others argue that some pay-for-performance incentives, particularly in financial services, are too high.
Are CEOs fired for poor performance?
CEO turnover levels have increased since the late 1990s, so CEOs can expect to be CEOs for less time than in the past. CEO turnover also has become increasingly related to poor firm stock performance. 13 This suggests boards and the corporate governance system having performed better in their monitoring role since the 1990s.
Jenter and Llewellen 14 present additional evidence consistent with this. They look at CEO turnover in ExecuComp firms from 1992 to 2004 and find "that boards aggressively fire CEOs for poor industry-adjusted performance, and that the turnoverperformance sensitivity increases substantially with higher quality boards." In the first five years of their tenure, CEOs who perform in the bottom quintile relative to their industry are 42 percent more likely to depart than top quintile CEOs. This spread increases to more than 70 percent for firms with higher quality boards -more independent boards with greater stock ownership. As with pay-for-performance, the more difficult question is whether these differential departure rates are optimal and whether current practices can be improved. 17 The National Income and Product Accounts, while they include public and private companies, also show that corporate profits as a fraction of GDP are at historically high levels. On average, then, particularly for non-financial companies, average operating performance has improved while average compensation has declined.
Summary
To summarize, I have considered the evidence for three common perceptions of U.S. corporate governance. The evidence is somewhat different from those perceptions.
While average public company CEO pay increased substantially through the 1990s, it has since declined. CEO pay levels relative to other highly paid groups today are comparable to or lower than their average levels in the early 1990s although they are still above the long-term historical average. The ratio of large-company CEO pay to firm market value is similar to its levels in the late 1970s and late 1950s, and lower than its earlier levels.
Furthermore, CEOs are typically paid for performance and penalized for poor performance. And finally, boards do monitor CEOs, and that monitoring appears to have increased over time. CEO tenures in the 2000s are lower than in the 1980s and 1990s, and CEO turnover is tied to poor stock performance.
In his 2012 work, Murphy concludes that executive compensation is affected by the interaction of a competitive market for talent, managerial power, and political factors.
That conclusion is hard to disagree with.
There have been corporate governance failures and pay outliers where managerial power surely has been exercised. And, CEO pay today is still extremely high relative to typical household income. At the same time, a meaningful part of CEO pay appears to have been driven by the market for talent. In recent decades, CEO pay is likely to have been affected by the same forces of technology and scale that have led to the general increase in incomes at the very top.
